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One feature of the neo/ liberal possessive self is the propertied character of certain beliefs: treated as 
belonging to those who hold them, recognised and supported in acting on the world, and protected. 
While an ownership paradigm predates anti-discrimination and human rights regimes, these regimes 
have consolidated and extended the propertied status of certain identity beliefs in ways that naturalise 
and siloise them. But if beliefs' propertied character is politically problematic, can it be unsettled and 
reformed? This paper considers one possible mode for doing so, namely play. Oftentimes, play works 
to secure and assert the propertied attachments people have to their beliefs; but some forms of play 
offer other possibilities. Focusing on the state as a complex site of play relations and encounters, this 
article explores how state play engages identity beliefs in a contemporary legal drama of colliding 
beliefs between conservative Christians and liberal gay equality advocates. 
 
This article contributes to the question of how neo/ liberal states in the global north play and 
what such play might do. Conventionally associated with instrumental, coercive action and 
dominance, states in the north are assumed to demonstrate logics and affects that are far from 
playful. At the same time, a growing body of work has explored these and other states’ 
relationship to play, from the use of satire in anti-government protests and game-playing 
between states and politicians, to institutional theatrics, and the gamification of resource 
allocation decisions (eg Edwards, 2013; Lerner, 2014; Rai 2015; Shepard 2011).1 For the 
most part, however, scholarship in this area treats the neo/ liberal state as either play’s subject 
or its object. This article takes a different approach, tracing the complex interrelationship of 
states to play in conditions where state bodies design and mobilise play while simultaneously 
functioning as the terrain, target and resources of play by others. Through such play, states 
and citizens constitute their division from one another, but play also provides a register for 
acts of fusion, contact, and corporeal exchange.  
Exploring these interconnected processes, this article focuses on state-based play in 
relation to the “propertisation” of beliefs. Specifically, it explores how play “plays with” the 
possessive ties attaching beliefs to their holders. Treating beliefs as belonging in property-
like ways is not a modern development; however, this discussion focuses on contemporary 
anti-discrimination and human rights law’s contribution to propertising authorised beliefs 
about one’s own and others’ identities. While may deem these laws an important progressive 
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development, one effect they have had has been to entrench certain identities and beliefs as 
things that “belong”. The problems this causes are highlighted when legally recognised 
identities and beliefs collide, for instance when people’s legally accepted attachment to a gay 
identity (and to beliefs about the equality of this identity) clash with others’ legally 
recognised (if less accepted) beliefs that gay sexuality is sinful and deviant.  
The litigation and wider legal drama to surface as a result of colliding conservative 
Christian and liberal gay beliefs about sexuality is the subject of this article. Arising most 
prominently in Britain, Canada, and the US and, to a lesser extent, in Australia and New 
Zealand, this conflict constitutes the latest stage in conservative Christianity’s far longer 
struggle over gender and sexuality. Having opposed decriminalisation, and the extension of 
human rights and anti-discrimination laws to gay people with limited success, conservative 
Christians in the late 1990s were compelled to change strategy.2 Their new approach focused 
less on challenging the legitimacy of gay rights and equality than on defending religious 
people’s right to “conscientiously object”. Cases to end up in court included Christian 
registrars, florists, photographers, cake-makers and venue owners claiming a legal 
entitlement to deny services and accommodation to same-sex couples on grounds of religious 
belief. Other cases involved school districts refusing to make gay-positive books available to 
teachers or students; and universities, student bodies and youth organisations denying “out” 
gays membership (Cooper and Herman, 2013; Malik, 2011; Pynes 2016; Stychin, 2009). The 
withdrawal, however, of rights, resources and recognition was not just on one side. An 
important effect of conservative Christian refusal was the corresponding withdrawal of 
promotions, partnerships, recognition, subsidies and accreditation by public (and other) 
bodies. In one British case, a religious couple who wanted to foster but could not promise to 
present gay sexuality as a valid choice to youngsters in their care found themselves 
confronting a local authority that refused to advance their application.3 In another case, a 
Canadian Christian college’s prohibition of same-sex relationships for students and staff 
precipitated a decision by provincial legal bodies not to recognise their new law degree.4   
This article takes up the legal drama over conservative Christian withdrawal to think 
about play; specifically, how and whether play can unsettle possessive beliefs. Exploring play 
through a legal drama of conservative Christian withdrawal may seem counter-intuitive given 
how seriously participants treated the stakes. But aside from the fact that gravity does not 
negate play’s presence, play proved a frame that participants – both explicitly and implicitly - 
drew upon. Certainly, at times, play seemed to consolidate and entrench possessive beliefs; 
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however, this article centres upon those instances where state-based play – from role-play and 
experimentation, to a political kind of clambering and ideological mischief – seemed to do 
something else. It is tempting to romanticise such play, to suggest it can unsettle propertied 
attachments; and certainly the forms of play I discuss did invoke some transfer of beliefs 
between bodies (individual, collective and institutional), or at least its simulation. However, 
the primary aim of this discussion is not to determine conclusively what play can do, but to 
explore the diverse ways play frames and shapes political relations, recognising that, in the 
process, larger questions emerge: namely, whether state-based politics in the neo/ liberal 
north would benefit from more play; what kinds of play this might be; and the conditions 
required for people to play “well” with states?5   
Possessive Beliefs and Play 
In his influential account of “possessive individualism”, CB Macpherson (1962) addressed 
the foundational place of property relations within liberal political theory, including in its 
understanding of the subject (coded as white, European and male) as owner of both his 
person and capacities.6  Approaching beliefs, today, as things that can also be “held” and 
possessed similarly reveals the extending power of property discourse, as religious, 
ontological and moral beliefs get constituted as the legally recognised social property of 
individual and group subjects within the neo/ liberal north (Cooper and Herman, 2013). The 
concept of beliefs as property does not mean beliefs are market-alienable, any more than 
other social properties such as whiteness (Harris, 1993; Grabham, 2009; Keenan, 2010). 
Rather, what it suggests is that “core” identity beliefs, including the belief that gay sexuality 
is natural and normal, as well as the countervailing belief that gay sexuality is sinful, deviant 
and outside of God’s plan, have become legally recognised as belonging to subjects in some 
deeply intimate way, authorising holders’ control over what the beliefs are; how they might 
be shared; and establishing their right to protection from invasion, defacement or destruction 
(also Nedelsky, 1990). Like Margaret Radin’s (1993) “property for personhood”, human 
rights and anti-discrimination discourse treats sex, gender and religious identity beliefs as 
property because they are deemed integral to enriched forms of personhood. In other words, 
if paradoxically, law treat identity beliefs (that is, beliefs closely attached to particular 
identities) as worthy of property-like protection and recognition largely because they are 
deemed not to actually resemble property – at least as commodified and severable things. 
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In recent years, British courts have engaged in extensive property thinking in relation 
to anti-gay religious refusal as they address the parameters of protectable manifested beliefs:7 
What counts as a core aspect of the religion such that exemption from anti-discrimination law 
(or, alternatively, recognition of the claimant’s right to anti-discrimination protection) might 
be permitted?8 Do the courts have the right to make such theological determinations or is the 
scope of the propertied object, namely what elements comprise a particular faith, subject only 
to the judgment of its religious “holders”?9  And how far should property-like protections 
extend; do they extend to “social” remarks about homosexuality - those expressed on an 
employee’s personal Facebook page, for instance, or by email to colleagues from an office 
computer after work, or to co-workers in an office?10 While British courts have limited the 
reach and force of religious beliefs about sexuality in terms of what they can accomplish, 
court judgments nevertheless confirm the normalised status of property thinking in 
understanding religious beliefs.  But if beliefs are treated as property, what, if anything, is 
wrong with this?  
Discussing dispossession, Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou (2013) explore the 
relationship between two of its meanings: dispossession as loss of land and livelihood; and 
the recognition that we are not atomistic, self-owning individuals. Arguments against 
possessive beliefs resonate with this latter claim. While the tie-up between possessive beliefs 
and individualism is complicated by the fact courts and participants also recognise identity 
beliefs as collectively held – with individuals described as belonging to their beliefs as much 
as the reverse – a primary rationale for protecting beliefs lies in individual freedom and 
growth. Like other dimensions of the liberal possessive self, affirming property in identity 
beliefs narrates a nomos of stable unitary subjects – each set apart from others, holding tight 
to their own beliefs, beliefs that belong to them, on which they are free to act, and on which, 
when they collide with other beliefs or identity statuses, the courts will adjudicate. As such, 
identity beliefs are treated like one’s children, partner or home, a constitutive part of intimate 
life, upon which others should not trespass, and about which they should not cast aspersions. 
But identity beliefs – outside their framing in liberal legal discourse - are not that private or 
reified. Socialised and relational in their conditions of emergence, evolution and change, 
identity beliefs circulate promiscuously, evolving, touching and being “held” (in the sense of 
being known and invoked) by diverse actors including those with no affinity or commitment 
to the beliefs in question. Many beliefs, including those that end up in court in litigation over 
conservative Christian withdrawal, are fundamentally political - addressing other people’s 
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ways of living and, as such, deeply contested. Treating beliefs as personal property 
depoliticises the values and social relations underpinning and fortified by them. While it 
protects and empowers particular beliefs - ostensibly out of respect for the frameworks of 
which they are part, and for the subjects who hold them - treating knowledge claims about the 
world as intimate property erases the intersubjective meaningfulness of their content; they 
simply become like any other thing that belongs.  
Yet, while identity beliefs are produced and consolidated as a form of social property, 
they are also subject to countervailing processes. For those beliefs deemed unacceptable, law 
may withdraw protection or even prohibit expression as has happened in some jurisdictions 
with the criminalisation of hate speech. Yet, as critical scholars have explored, strategies that 
rely on coercive and penal law can be problematic. An alternative strategy of withdrawing 
property protection from identity beliefs altogether also has limitations, risking a rougher 
social environment in which vulnerable populations are abandoned to locally dominant social 
norms. Therefore, without arguing that play should substitute for law (as if the two were 
distinct and different), can play nonetheless provide a flexible, open-ended response, which 
brings the political back into propertied beliefs? This may be a response that is fun, disarming 
and subversive, but not all the state-based play explored here falls into this category. What 
play-approaches do share, however, in contrast to juridical prohibition-based responses, is a 
readiness to transfer and repurpose beliefs (along with the property held in them). But before 
exploring play’s presence in this legal drama any further, let me say something briefly about 
play. 
To think play in ways that illuminate state practice, I approach it as both a quality and 
kind of activity involving creative, satisfying, open-ended and willing11  interactions between 
bodies, things and spaces.12 In many ways a familiar conceptualisation, two elements are 
particularly important for this account of play. First, play can be outcome-oriented even as its 
process may be what is fundamentally satisfying and pleasurable. Second, play has an elastic, 
mutable, protean quality, a surplus that exceeds what appears to be done. Play’s mutability 
emerges in the simulation of other bodies and roles; in reusing or repurposing a terrain or 
object (acting as if it is other than it is usually taken to be); and in the coexistence of multiple 
interpretive frames or forms – that concertina-like quality of action, as it simultaneously 
holds and expresses different possibilities; put nicely by Bateson (1987: 185-6) when he 
writes: the “playful nip denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would be denoted by the 
bite” (see also Nachmanovitch 2009: 1).  
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Attaching and Securing Beliefs  
This paper focuses on state-based play; however, the legal drama over conservative Christian 
withdrawal reveals other kinds of play, also important for this discussion in highlighting how 
play can express and secure, not just unsettle, possessive beliefs. To begin with, many of the 
litigated disputes concerned recreational and pleasure-seeking activities as “out” lesbian and 
gay subjects, seeking to live out gay-positive beliefs, were turned away from guesthouse 
vacations, wedding venues, youth camps, and school proms. At the same time, conservative 
Christians claimed their right to act according to beliefs was also at stake. Conservative 
Christians drew on play to rationalise service-refusal in two ways. First, rejecting the 
servitude associated with work (Kane, 2004), Christian “conscientious objectors” asserted a 
mimetic sovereign defiance. While deference to God’s law was often the explicit reason for 
rejecting same-sex couple’s requests for wedding cakes, venues, or guesthouse rooms, in the 
process conservative Christian providers assumed (or projected) the role of an imagined ruler 
entitled to say “no” despite contravening secular authority. This take-up of play’s imitative 
dimension (if not its pleasures) contrasts with a second use of play in which litigants drew 
explicitly on their right to artistic satisfaction as florists, wedding cake-makers, calligraphers 
and photographers.13 From this perspective, the legal requirement upon them not to 
discriminate clashed with what Christian litigants claimed were their legitimate creative and 
expressive rights.  
Play also emerged in more agonistic form. Leaving to one side the game-like quality 
of litigation itself, participants used ingenious forms of play to expose others’ beliefs. With 
play here used for the rather unplay-like purpose of revealing others’ “illegitimate” 
commitments, actors became play objects, toyed with as they became subjected to a “play” 
determined in advance (see also Kane, 2004). One such case concerned Ms Pilkington, a 
Christian, British-based psychotherapist, secretly recorded by a journalist who was passing as 
an unhappy gay man “looking to be ‘cured’”.14 An American example, in which a 
conservative Christian bakery was “played with” in order to unmask it, was Masterpiece 
Cakeshop.15 As part of the legal action brought against the cakeshop for refusing to make gay 
wedding or commitment ceremony cakes, Stephanie Schmalz (one of several people whose 
request was rejected) contacted the shop saying she was a dog breeder planning a dog 
wedding celebration. Her affidavit states, “I specified that for the ‘dog wedding’ I wanted a 
cake large enough to serve about 20 people, in the shape of a dog bone, and lettered with the 
names Roscoe and Buffy. Mr. Phillips stated no objection to filling this order.”16  
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What is striking in these diverse instances is how play and beliefs remain closely 
attached. Certainly, play takes different (including some rather unplay-like) forms; at the 
same time its practice is intended to secure and demonstrate subjects’ relationships to their 
beliefs, including on occasion by unmasking them. Since liberal legal discourse depicts these 
identity beliefs as possessions, the question becomes not whether such beliefs “belong” (since 
this is largely assumed) but how their propertied contours should be drawn: where can anti-
gay beliefs be manifested and what can they be allowed to do? Yet, the legal drama over 
conservative Christian withdrawal also reveals glimpses of other kinds of play, where the 
possessive relationship between subjects and their beliefs – Christian beliefs but not only 
theirs – are contested, redrawn or oriented to other ends. In tracing these other kinds of play, I 
explore the place of the state as it moves from facilitator, to player, to conduit, terrain and 
target, and address the changing relations of separation, fusion and contact enacted in the 
process. 
Role-Playing Others’ Beliefs 
Liberal governments not uncommonly turn to play to promote “good relations”, particularly 
across ethnic and cultural cleavages (Johnson and Tatam, 2009; DfE, 2014: 34). While 
academic assessments remain mixed;17 policy-makers suggest play can heal divisions, 
minimise distrust, and forge bridging capital between antagonistic or unfamiliar social 
groups. In Britain, the legal duty placed on public bodies to promote “good relations” is one 
example of a formally legislated attempt to use voluntary contact, including play, to minimise 
inter-cultural hostility. In other policy contexts, the need to promote better dialogue and 
decision-making between adversarial or distrustful participants can also give rise to play.   
In their account of role-play to build consensus among governmental and community 
participants addressing water management and conservation in California, Innes and Booher 
(1999) explore how playing together over a period of time, in ways that engage people’s 
capacity for improvisation, speculation and imagination, can help participants with competing 
interests and perspectives find mutually satisfactory solutions. Role-play requires people to 
act as if their beliefs, judgments and interests were otherwise. Thus, in the water management 
discussions, facilitators encouraged participants to draw on non-official, more personal roles 
(as cyclist rather than water board employee, for instance) to help participants get distance 
from their own positions and interests, and to consider solutions from analogous contexts.18 
Innes and Booher’s (1999) account resonates with Josh Lerner’s (2014) transnational study of 
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how public bodies can use games to generate more publicly engaged decision-making, such 
as when allocating resources. Here too, play provides a structure that helps participants to 
think about modes of conflict resolution which embrace others’ needs and interests also.  
Applied to the legal drama of conservative Christian withdrawal, we might imagine state 
bodies – schools, local authorities, hospitals, police forces – developing role-play activities 
with staff, users and publics holding competing sexual beliefs to identify strategies for 
handling or avoiding conservative Christian refusal. Such an approach would extend already 
trialled initiatives to improve working relations between “out” gay and conservative Christian 
staff (eg, Afridi and Warmington, 2010; Malik, 2008). However, rather than getting 
participants to just talk through their differences, according to a logic of tolerance and respect 
for different (stable) identity beliefs, role-switching, games, hypothetical outcomes, and 
stories of imagined times ahead might be used to temporarily loosen people’s ties to their 
normative commitments, moral understandings and desired futures. But, aside from whether 
temporarily suspending or swapping beliefs through play makes any longer-term difference - 
indeed, whether conservative Christian and liberal equality beliefs can be meaningfully 
bracketed, even briefly, to find win-win solutions given the intensity with which they are 
held19  - using games and play to reduce conflict frames political relations in particular ways. 
It assumes the goal is agreement rather than sustaining dissent; treats each “side’s” beliefs as 
equally valid (tacitly reinforcing their propertied rather than political status); and - like the 
policy gamification discussed by Lerner (2014) - positions state bodies apart and distinct 
from those they induce to play. Therefore, for the rest of this discussion, I turn to other kinds 
of play to have emerged in this legal drama: play that complicates and unsettles any notion of 
the detached, neutral, play-managing state.  
Nationalising Equality Beliefs 
For conservative Christians, neo/ liberal states in the global north have undertaken a massive 
“nationalisation” programme; converting contentious grass-roots beliefs in gay equality and 
gay pride into state property. This nationalisation is immediately evident in considering the 
very different treatment accorded to right-wing religious beliefs. While beliefs in religious 
equality are equally institutionalised, nation-states such as Britain treat the religious claim 
that gay sex is sinful as private property belonging to religious holders rather than the state 
and, like other forms of dangerous private property (eg, guns and fire),  constrained in where 
it can be manifested and what it can be used to do. Facing property limitations in their own 
9 
 
beliefs, conservative Christians do not read the nationalisation of gay equality as an 
“appropriation” but rather as reinforcing and strengthening gay people’s identity property. 
Indeed, it is government and public agencies’ protection and investment in gay equality, 
requiring other bodies to give life to these beliefs whether or not they actually hold them, 
which sparked much conservative Christian withdrawal. But in what sense does state 
nationalisation, and the struggles surrounding it, involve play?  
 We might see play’s presence, or at least catch glimpses, in the inventiveness with 
which state bodies tackled this new agendum.20 However, I want to focus here on play’s 
discursive take-up to slur state conduct. Both conservative Christian and gay activists used 
play discourse to critique state action in ways that foregrounded the political (rather than 
propertied) character of sexual beliefs. For conservative Christians, this involved denouncing 
state promotion of gay equality as irresponsible experimentation – recklessly engaged in 
without caring or knowing what the consequences might be. In one British case, a magistrate 
informed the family panel, on which he sat, that he could not assess same-sex couples 
seeking adoption, because "insufficient research had been undertaken in relation to whether 
this was desirable, and that he did not approve of the idea of children being ‘guinea pigs’ in 
the name of politically correct legislation.”21 Heterodox sexualities were seemingly too risky 
and contentious to be subject to state innovation in support of new public beliefs. But it was 
not only conservative Christians who deployed imaginaries of play in order to critique the 
state.  
In her discussion of Hegelian self-consciousness, Judith Butler (2007) gives voice to 
the lord’s claim that the bondsman “be my body for me”. Elsewhere, I have explored (and 
inverted) its conceptual terms to think about social movement demands that state formations 
take up their political projects, embodying them as if they were the state’s own (Cooper, 
2013). In the Hegelian story, Butler (2007: 36-38) tells, the bondsman does all the labour, yet 
owns nothing of what is produced, stamped by the master with his own name. In the very 
different story told here, “be my body” is an invocation that states stamp agendas and 
programs, such as gay equality, with its own name. The desire for beliefs to become public 
property, with the institutionalisation and empowerment presumed to follow, is an important 
aspect of activist state engagement (at least for some). Instead of gay equality being simply 
recognised as a legitimate belief for gay people to hold, the state acts as if the belief was its 
own. But while gay equality activists may hope their ideas or beliefs will become part of the 
institutional fabric, integrated with other public governance commitments, there is also 
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disquiet. Writers and activists have long argued that state incorporation leads politics to be 
“watered down” even as (but more likely because) state bodies mark such politics with their 
own signature (eg, Ahmed 2012; Carabine and Monro, 2004: 319). In part, this dilution is 
associated with the contradictory character of state formations engaged in supporting 
competing projects, giving voice to divergent rationalities and logics, and embodying 
contrasting agendas. But it also comes from the way beliefs, unlike many forms of property, 
appear as non-fungible. Transferred to and taken up by new (institutional) bodies - in 
Rancière’s (2004) terms moving from politics to police - beliefs change.  
 Running through sexual activists’ engagement with public authorities, then, is a 
longstanding unease that states are playing and playing inappropriately. For play is read as 
meaning public bodies are not properly committed to gay equality, contributing a signature 
that is dramaturgical rather than productive, enacting a performance not intended to have 
performative effects (also Ahmed, 2012). Public bodies may refer to their objectives and 
goals but these are read critically as simply part of the play – lacking life beyond the “magic 
circle” in which contentious, not really intended to be realised, public projects languish (see 
also Lind and Keating 2013). Yet, while gay activists use play’s terms and imagery to 
discount the reality of state commitment, they simultaneously maintain a complex 
relationship to property in gay equality beliefs. On the one hand, as guardians, they sustain a 
collective, steward-like property, demanding states make public ownership of gay equality 
beliefs meaningful. At the same time, scepticism about the state feeds an understanding of 
such equality beliefs as political claims to be fought over rather than beliefs to secure, 
protect, and recognise simply because they belong to gay subjects. Treating gay equality as a 
political claim also underpins a further relationship between activists and state bodies. While 
activists may ask states to “be my body for me”, sometimes the relationship is reversed so 
that activists come to embody or ventriloquise state beliefs. And sometimes they may do so in 
ways that are not simply a transmission but also a translation: re-making the public property 
held in such beliefs. I want to consider this wily kind of play in ANT terms as “kick-back” – 
where those ostensibly enrolled in supporting state property reframe it in ways that (tacitly) 
challenge official discourse.    
Playing as if Activist Beliefs were State Beliefs 
My example comes from a media story about a British trainer running a homophobic 
awareness session for teachers.22According to one teacher who attended, at some point during 
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the day the trainer remarked: ‘What makes you all think that to be heterosexual is natural?’23 
At this point, the teacher, along with several others, walked out.24 The teacher was 
subsequently suspended,25 in part for comments later relayed to the organisers regarding 
God’s wrath towards homosexuals, comments which vandalised, in a sense, state-held 
property in liberal sexuality beliefs. However, we might also read the trainer’s quoted 
remarks as an instance in which a social movement activist refused to play exactly as she was 
supposed to, stepping outside the liberal terms of anti-homophobic training even as the 
mantle of state-mandated action authorised her question. Exposing the social character of 
heterosexuality challenged conservative religious beliefs along with liberal state ones. It also 
expressed a belief outside the logic of possessive belonging. Questioning heterosexuality’s 
naturalness was not intended as a claim to, or an enactment of, property (that the belief 
deserved to be institutionally recognised, protected and empowered as something belonging 
to the trainer). Rather, what was asserted was the belief’s political character, even as the 
context and performance – challenging heteronormativity in an officially designated teacher 
training session - re-presented the belief as public property; in other word as a belief proper 
to the official training she had been employed to provide.  
We can read the trainer’s intervention in terms other than play. But what play 
illuminates, in incidents such as this, is the satisfaction that can come from challenging 
ingrained beliefs; the concertina-like relationship to state authority (acting as if speaking on 
behalf of the state while knowing one is not); and the game-type moves that follow. While far 
from contained within play’s “magic circle”, dramas like this develop their own tempo, 
rhythms and spaces, generating moves that appear increasingly un-playlike, particularly as 
disciplinary action and sanctions get invoked. Provocations, such as this trainer’s, may appear 
very modest, but they can precipitate a series of events that end with dismissal and litigation. 
Yet, as a way of destabilising public and private propertied beliefs, the problem with kick-
back lies in the fragility of the initial challenge. As one game move leads to another and 
institutional processes take over, the playful force of the original provocation: ‘What makes 
you all think that to be heterosexual is natural?’ gets quickly lost. 
So far, I have discussed the transactional movement of beliefs through play where 
others’ beliefs are held or imitated as if they belonged (temporarily or permanently) to the 
holder/ imitator or, in the case of the trainer just discussed, as if the player’s beliefs actually 
belonged to the state. In my final discussion, I want to consider a different scenario in which 
gay groups used nationalised beliefs in gay equality to play downwind with resistant local 
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authorities. The episode, a Canadian legal drama from the late 1990s, concerned city mayors 
who refused to issue gay pride proclamations in contexts where proclamations for other 
causes were routinely given.26 Interestingly, when litigated, the courts repeatedly found in 
favour of gay claimants challenging the proclamation denials. Mayors could not refuse to 
“endorse” homosexuality; nor could they deny it “pride” given the particular history of its 
attachment.27 In this way, courts treated gay pride as both valuable and vulnerable.  
At one level, these mayoral proclamation cases can be read as invoking an entitlement 
to celebratory play, treating it as a communal rather than merely individual property that a 
mayoral proclamation adds value to. At another level, the cases reveal grass-roots attempts to 
citify gay pride as a publicly held property, whose endorsement not only affirmed gay 
equality as a legitimate belief for gays, collectively and individually, to hold but as something 
belonging to the city also. But what I want to explore, in this legal drama, is the way 
provincial (and so formally superordinate) gay rights norms were deployed to play with the 
local state. The alignment between provincial and activist beliefs in gay equality was not here 
about activists’ stewardship - maintaining custodianship of beliefs in conditions where public 
bodies appear to be merely playing - but rather using the pincer-like character of co-
ownership to make contact with city councils. We can read this contact, with its improvised 
tactics, energies, rhythms, and “as if” qualities, as playful. I want to think about it as “free-
running” the state. 
Free-Running States 
In its more familiar physical form, free-running (otherwise known as parkour) constitutes a 
highly skilled, recreational activity of running, tumbling, scaling and mounting 
predominantly urban, human-engineered landscapes (Saville, 2008); a way of re-experiencing 
alienating physical terrain as stimulating and challenging rather than grim and depressing 
(Atkinson, 2009; also O’Grady, 2012). Here, I consider free-running the neo/ liberal state in 
conditions where superordinate institutional recognition made toeholds in subordinate state 
apparatuses both possible and desirable.  
As a playful way of doing politics and a political way of doing play, state free-running 
shares something in common with the “rhetorical art of jujitsu”, in which, according to 
Christine Harold (2007: 191), “existing cultural forms” are “playfully and provocatively 
fold[ed]… in on themselves”, in an effort to redirect these forms “toward new ends”. 
However, the kind of jujitsu Harold (2007) describes tends to involve wittily redirecting or 
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reversing corporate and product messages to consumers. By contrast, the free-running I 
discuss uses superordinate state norms and authority to re-tether and redeploy a “delinquent” 
state part. State free-running also parallels the “city hacking” described by Michiel de Lange; 
a process in which citizens envision themselves as agents of social change, able to and intent 
on reshaping their urban environment.28 Like city hacking, free-running involves the pleasure 
of undertaking a challenge as well as the curiosity piqued by tinkering with things to discover 
how they work. However, free-running the state is less intent on reconfiguring the political 
landscape than playfully re-purposing it. This doesn’t mean free-running accepts the 
neoliberal institutional landscape. However, its focus is on the political opportunities and 
resources (symbolic and material) that neo/ liberal state bodies (intentionally or otherwise) 
make available.29  
Free-running reveals how institutionally recognised and accepted beliefs generate 
traction. In the pride proclamation cases, free-runners take up identity beliefs that have 
become superior state property, yet still remain attached to them, in part because the beliefs 
are about them and what they are due.30 Anarchists and postcolonial scholars are typically 
critical of the desire for recognition from an oppressive state formation (eg, see Coulthard, 
2014). But from a different left perspective, recognition becomes a register or means of 
action rather than its goal; one that enables activists to make contact (which can be for many 
different purposes) with public bodies. In his study, Atkinson (2009: 190) cites interviewee 
descriptions of free-running as being like “flowing water”, which “effortlessly pass[es] 
across, under, over, or around any environmental obstacle it encounters”. Community 
activists in the mayoral proclamation cases likewise cross state bodies swiftly and surely, 
searching for crevices and protuberances that might make a productive grip possible.31 
Engaged in an improvised form of political dance (also Saville, 2008: 899), they go from 
mayoral office to sympathetic politicians, to bureaucrats, city council committees, and 
eventually to the courts, pursuing a proclamation.32  
In free-running, it is suggested, bodies and landscapes blend. According to Atkinson 
(2009: 170), the “lines separating roads, buildings, cultures, selves, and bodies disappear[]”. 
But when it comes to state free-running, this fusion is not always welcomed. An American 
case, which demonstrates this, involves not the superordinate state of the pride proclamation 
cases but an attempt by gay activists to mobilise city equality commitments and so remove a 
building subsidy from the local Boy Scouts because of the latter’s exclusionary policy 
towards gay men, which violated city non-discrimination laws.33 One aspect of the case 
concerned whether a gay lobby group, the “working group”, had exerted improper influence 
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on the, then, city solicitor. The evidence was a series of email exchanges set out in the 
judgment. One email from the group reminded the city solicitor not to do “a disservice to the 
LGBT community of which you are a part” (italics added).34 Repeatedly, emails asked for 
copies of draft letters from the City to the Boy Scouts to be circulated to group members; 
identified members as advocating going “public about the City’s… secret agreement”; and 
imperiously remarked: “your recent communication with the Scouts may indicate a 
willingness on your part to move in the right direction. On the other hand, a meeting in the 
near future really does mean the near future” (italics added).35  
Emails from the working group suggest a mimetic enactment of governmental 
authority and, as such, demonstrate how co-ownership of gay equality can be deployed, not 
always in progressive or apparently appropriate ways, to assert a governmental fusion. But 
such fusion can also be resisted. The Cradle of Liberty Council judgment also includes the 
emailed replies of the city solicitor, kicking back against the working group’s assertion of 
governmental authority.36 While the city solicitor’s response was criticised by the plaintiffs, 
read against the working group’s emails, his brief replies suggest a polite refusal to be 
dictated to as well as a reminder of his legal role in contrast to their position as community 
members. More generally, we can read his response as refusing free-running’s attempt to 
meld political bodies through the deployed device of ostensibly shared identity beliefs.  
The discomfort expressed in the Cradle of Liberty Council emails raises an important 
issue for the pride proclamation cases. In state free-running, activist attempts to tumble and 
traverse state machinery at speed – crossing and invoking procedures, personnel, powers and 
places – can lead to exposure, upset and humiliation as several proclamation cases describe. 
In Hudler, the court commented on the “great deal of negative …even hostile comment about 
the club [that sought the proclamation] …in radio phone-in shows; in letters to the editor… in 
telephone calls and letters [to the club]… and in conversations on the street and in the 
workplace.”37 Can attempts to get a proclamation, then, be usefully considered play given the 
risks of getting hurt? This is a difficult issue. I do not want to trivialise the stress and 
vulnerability caused by pride proclamation challenges, nor the many non-play ways in which 
participants understood their involvement and the effects of refusal. In Hudler, lesbian and 
gay community members spoke about “feeling personally hurt and diminished”; the negative 
effects of refusal on other gay service users; and the chilling effect on other public bodies”.38  
However, my account does not treat mayoral refusals as play, nor equate state free-running 
with frivolity but rather with willing, creative moves that skilfully traverse the boundary 
between safety and harm, with its mingling of anger, pain and pleasure (see also Saville 
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2008: 892-3). More generally, what state free-running usefully emphasises is the edgy 
pleasure and emotional intensity that can come from making contact with a body that wants 
to resist but will eventually prove unable to. This is a body, whose belief in homosexuality’s 
undesirability has become precarious, absent the institutional protection necessary for it to act 
governmentally. Superordinate state law has recalibrated property in beliefs, and mayoral 
attempts to treat homosexuality as worthless have become officially de-authorised. While 
local cities may continue to kick-back, state free-running (and the litigation it enrolled) 
imposed a new propertied settlement, such that cities became obliged to express gay equality 




The notion that personhood has become increasingly subject to a property logic is far from 
new. Many scholars have drawn on Locke, Hegel and other foundational property thinkers to 
explore the relationship between ownership, things and the self. However, little of this work 
foregrounds the contemporary propertisation of identity beliefs as these become legally 
defined, recognised, protected and enabled as things that “belong” and, as such, worthy of 
respect. Anti-discrimination and human rights law provisions have been important 
contributors to this process, formally equalising the property that recognised identities and 
beliefs can bear – a redistribution that remains far from uncontentious as the legal drama over 
liberal gay equality norms and conservative Christian withdrawal highlights. However, while 
this legal drama has focused on the rights and legitimate expectations of different parties, the 
political currents swirling around it also reveal a different mode of engagement, namely of 
play. 
 With its mischievous, imitative, plastic modes of action, play can seem to rework the 
tight attachments between subjects and their beliefs through a series of transactional moves. 
The first I explored involved public bodies using role-play and consensus-building to 
encourage people to temporarily suspend their attachments to particular beliefs (or interests) 
to find new creative resolutions to conflicts. In the second, social movements passed their 
beliefs to states who represented them mimetically in ways that also changed the beliefs in 
question. In conditions where activists felt obliged to remain attentive to how states took up 
their beliefs, attuned to the “as if” game-like quality that often seemed to accompany state 
claims that equality beliefs belonged to them, other forms of play also emerged. One involved 
kick-back, where those enrolled in equality programs refused to just be conduits of state-
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assumed beliefs, and instead used the institutional spaces and opportunities made available to 
express grass-roots ideas as if they were state ones. Here, rather than asking the state to “be 
my body for me”, activists took up the position of the state’s body, simulating state authority 
while expressing non-state beliefs. Finally, in state free-running, activists traversed an 
institutional landscape of state machinery, using skill, persistence and, in my example, the 
resources of superordinate state recognition to make contact with dissident city councils, 
where thanks to subsequent court backing, activists compelled municipal bodies to speak and 
act identity beliefs they did not want to hold, such as gay pride, as if they held them.  
 Teasing out these complex relations highlights the circulatory character of this form 
of play. Beliefs move between players, and get stuck upon play’s objects, as groups, 
individuals, and state bodies act as if the beliefs they now express are theirs, or as if their 
beliefs now belong to another. But while this may seem like an elaborate card game, its value 
is far from ludic. Play is often read in polarised ways – romanticised by advocates, dismissed 
by critics. The account offered here, by contrast, traces a middle path. While my starting 
point was the potential for play to unsettle possessive beliefs, exploring this potential led me 
to address the ways play may reinforce such beliefs or draw on shared (and propertied) 
beliefs to make contact with institutional bodies possible. This equivocation is unsurprising 
since we are talking about play which, with its multiple frames of meaning and action, 
necessarily refuses any easy instrumentality or use. But while this may suggest play is no 
simple solution to the problem of possessive beliefs, it also suggests that the dismissal of 
state-based play – either alongside the dismissal of the state or in order to retrieve the state as 
a weighty formation - is equally faulty.39  
This article has explored some ways state-based play shapes and frames political 
relations. Doing so prompts, in turn, more normative questions about the value of play 
involving states – not only play that satirically critiques state action (the subject of much 
academic discussion), but play that state bodies actively engage inalso.. State play can be 
cruel and harmful to those who become its objects; it may distract and trivialise; reinforce 
asymmetries of need; and seal off important political issues from the heartland of governance 
activities. For state play to support a progressive transformative politics, far more democracy, 
freedom, equality and social justice are necessary. But with these caveats in mind, 
recognising that not all state-based play is state-organised play, and recognising too that 
playing with states may over time change what states are (like), play poses an interesting and 
challenging register for thinking about governing – how it happens but, more importantly, 
how it could happen. With its creativity, openness and pleasures (melancholy pleasures as 
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well as exciting, risky pleasures), play, I think, deserves far more attention in what it can 
offer for doing - which may inevitably be a prefigurative doing of - institutional life.  
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